For various reasons my wife and I have been looking at a form of communication called Non-Violent Communication (NVC) developed by Marshall Rosenberg. It is used and taught to counsellors, military personnel, aid workers, corporations around the world. It is at its base level a counselling technique that aims to allow one to fulfill needs (based largely, but extended, on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs) through identification of the feelings triggered by these needs not being met. It also teaches one to empathise with others, which ultimately requires learning to listen – properly i.e. not giving your opinion; not telling someone what they are doing/ feeling wrong but accepting that what they are saying is based on what they are feeling and thus one can hear their needs. Combined these techniques allow one to communicate effectively with others.
However my wife and I have found this difficult. I can empathise, it’s a struggle, I fall into patterns of saying ‘Oh well you should do this’ or I end up being defensive and making excuses rather than saying for example, ‘Oh you’ve been looking after our son all day and you are feeling tired and you would rather I didn’t ramble at you as soon as you get home about what I’ve been reading because it makes you feel irritated.’ But I can do it although sometimes it takes the shit to hit the fan for me to realise I haven’t been listening and I need to do so, quickly. However I am getting better, and it is amazing what just listening to what someone has to say can do to their self-worth.
This of course has relevance to Hearing Voices Groups and their efficacy but this is not the aim of this post. As I said I can empathise, but expressing my feelings is hard. Perhaps that is why I facilitate the groups in an NHS setting rather than participate as a member of HVN? Now I must say both my partner and I find the language awkward, unnatural and unwieldly, although we get the principles and try to use them in a more colloquial way. Own your feelings, don’t say ‘you’ say ‘I’ etc. However, my difficulty is not so much the language but actually identifying my feelings. We have printed out a list of feelings and we refer to them when we need to express ourselves but I seem to be unable to actually identify them unless looking at these sheets. If I read them then I can go yes that is what I am feeling, if you ask me without the sheet, then it is ‘I dunno’. Currently my partner is reading Why Love Matters by Sue Gerhardt and she has identified this as a disregulation between the emotional and symbolic parts of the brain. I’m not keen on the term ‘disregulation’ but for lack of better knowledge I’m stuck with it. Language is often no more than the failure to express our thoughts and emotions and thus becomes the use of what is available as the next best thing, something that comes from a shared experience but is never truly our own. Anyway, it seems I am perfectly at ease at identifying my emotions in text but not in verbal language, according to Gerhardt this is due to early experiences often due to a significant other having a similar problem.
I have to point out right now, this is not ‘blame’, I do not like that word and is often bandied around as a censoring accusation due to an inability to take responsibility for our actions. If I cannot learn from my history, my psychological make-up, my experiences, my life and all that has occured in it then I cannot develop, I cannot move on. As Habermas suggests without learning from our mistakes and those of others then all learning (copying, memory, rote etc) is merely accidental. We make this world and this world makes us. Deal with it. We are both responsible for our actions AND our actions are affected by others. We have to deal with the consequences of our actions but we should not be expected to predict perfectly what they are, we WILL make mistakes. As Hannah Arendt points out if we cannot forgive then we are stuck in a circle of vengeance. Of course it does bring up the important question of how we can have action, political or otherwise, that does not stem from ressentiment or the position of a schöne seele, a belle âme, a beautiful soul.
So at this point I jump. Why bring this up? I’m reading Giddens’ Capitalism and Modern Theory at the moment, primarily as revision for teaching and while reading Weber’s ideas on forms of social conduct I started thinking on his views on rationality, primarily as I am trying to apply Habermas to Hearing Voices Groups. Weber has four basic forms of social conduct.
1. Purposively Rational Conduct, the individually rationally assesses the probable results of a given act in terms of the calculation of means to an end.
2. Value Rational Conduct, is directed towards an overriding ideal.
3. Affective Conduct is that which is carried out under the sway of some sort of emotional state and as such is on the borderline of meaningful and non-meaningful conduct.
4. Traditional Action is carried out under the influence of custom and habit, and as such is also on the borderline of meaningful and non-meaningful conduct.
So if we return to NVC, we can understand our affective conduct as an expression of unmet needs. Weber understands it as action for its own sake, if we are to understand NVC this is not strictly true, but it is not purposive or value rational, it may borderline traditional in the sense that we often return to learnt habits from others when acting emotionally. However I would argue that NVC brings purposive rational conduct, or instrumental action into this by having as a goal the fulfillment of one’s needs (I would argue however that it is not strategic action, NVC requires plain language that avoids perlocutions). Thus it brings a reason to affective conduct, or a source of reason. Psychological blocks, or as I now call them having learnt the etymology of the word from the Ancient Greek for ‘obstacle’, satans, are what gets in the way of purposive action. And as such, if not rational in the sense that rational is often contrasted to affective behaviour, are reasonable forms of conduct. Interestingly enough this is attained through communication, but contrasts, as instrumental behaviour, slightly from Habermas’ ideal type of communicative rationality.
Of course Weber’s concept of rationality stems from Kant, who wished to divest all emotional or affective thought and behaviour from reason. Thus we have a form of alienated soul, where the ideal of pure reason, the transcendent external God is separated from its emotional blocks, its satans. If this is the case, how can political action escape from the subject as beautiful soul? How can we subjectify ourselves if we don’t drag along with us our blocks in communication our emotional outbursts? Perhaps Deleuze was right when he stated that in resistance to the Control Society ‘the key thing may be to create vacuoles of noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control.’ (Negotiations, p. 175)